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Summary 
Liberal peace represents a dominant paradigm of contemporary peacebuilding based on 
the principles of democratization and marketization. This approach is sustained by the 
assumption that states with strong political democratic institutions, which ensure political 
representation and a market economy, guarantee sustainable economic growth and 
provide basic public goods, are necessary conditions for establishing durable peace. 
Within this dominant approach, scholars have distinguished several gradations that place 
their emphasis on specific aspects. Therefore, several models can be distinguished within 
the liberal peace paradigm, in particular, the conservative, the orthodox and the 
emancipatory models, which prioritize, respectively, institutions of government and rule 
of law, democratic liberal governance, and welfare and social justice. 
Within this paradigm the EU stance on peacebuilding and conflict management policy 
is difficult to categorize. The current EU peacebuilding approach is the result of evolving 
policy practices and not of a preconceived general policy. As a reaction to the 
international debates on peacebuilding, the EU adopted a mosaic of disperse documents 
on specific priorities that later were progressively incorporated into EU activities. At the 
same time, there is rather limited discussion of the very principles and objectives of the 
EU peacebuilding approach. Therefore, in order to discuss these questions and to assess 
EU peacebuilding policy, this report focuses on EU practices for dealing with conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding. Specifically, the report assesses, in the light of liberal peace 
modalities, the main patterns of EU peacebuilding practices pursued in the framework of 
the Instrument for Stability (IfS). This instrument was conceived as the Commission’s 
response to the demands of the greater EU’s involvement in conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding activities. With a budget of € 2 billion for the 2007-2013 period, the IfS 
permits the EU’s engagement in crisis and conflict response as well as in tackling 
structural sources of security risk and threats throughout the world.  
After four years of implementation, the IfS provides a very comprehensive view of the 
broad range of EU practices in the field of peacebuilding and crisis response. The framing 
of the IfS measures as well as the particular measures analyzed in this report reflect the 
EU consensus on conservative and orthodox models of liberal peace, emphasizing 
fundamental security challenges in post-conflict situations and the building of law and 
order institutions as well as political and economic problems and democratic governance 
institutions. There are very few measures of an emancipatory version of liberal peace 
characterized by transcendence of identity and sovereignty problems through contextual 
legitimacy and respect for local cultures. However, in view of the frequent failure of more 
traditional approaches to peacebuilding efforts and the planned renegotiation of the 
Instrument for Stability for the period 2014 to 2020, the report concludes that some 
proposals deriving from this variant of liberal peace should be seriously considered as a 
valid alternative or at least a supplement to existing EU approaches. 
The report begins by introducing the central debates about liberal peacebuilding 
consensus and setting out the analytical criteria framing the assessment of current IfS 
peacebuilding practices. The third section of the report describes the main functional 
 II 
characteristics of the Instrument for Stability, indicating the apparent consensus 
concerning a broad and comprehensive approach to peacebuilding. The fourth section 
analyses the governance practices observed during implementation of the IfS. The fifth 
section assesses qualitatively the use of the different tools offered by the Instrument for 
Stability, pointing out the main patterns of EU peacebuilding practices in light of various 
models of liberal peace practices. The sixth section presents the particular challenge of 
ensuring the appropriate institutional structures for the IfS within the European External 
Action Service. And finally, the last section concludes and sketches out various scenarios 
of the role of the IfS in the EU’s peacebuilding and conflict prevention policy. 
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1.  Introduction1
The European Union has traditionally presented itself as a successful peace project that 
ensured the reconciliation and peaceful development of Western Europe during the Cold 
War and subsequent reintegration of divided Europe, bringing about stability and 
prosperity. The Treaty on European Union emphasized that one of the objectives of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy was preserving peace and strengthening 
international security, while the Treaty establishing the European Community included 
the objectives of promoting democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as well as fostering the sustainable economic and social 
development of developing countries, their integration into the world economy and the 
campaign against poverty. 
In view of this particular self-conception and legal mandate, in the last decade the EU 
has become very active in multiple crises and conflicts around the globe with the aim of 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding. A crucial contribution to the development of the 
EU’s peacebuilding policy was the development of civilian and military crisis 
management capabilities and the deployment of an increasing number of missions under 
the umbrella of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU also 
developed a whole series of policy documents conceptualizing the principles, objectives 
and methods of addressing peacebuilding demands, and developed many policy tools 
employed under different conditions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This 
growth of EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities was exceptionally dynamic 
after the adoption of the Communication on Conflict Prevention (European Commission 
2001) and the EU Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts or so-called 
“Gothenburg Programme” (Council of the European Union 2001). In both cases scant 
attention was paid to outlining a general approach to peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention. The main concern was technocratic reflections and plans on institutional 
cooperation enhancing coherence and efficiency. Despite this neglect, it seems that the 
EU embraced a multidimensional and comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, with an 
emphasis on long-term and integrated prevention activities addressing root causes of 
conflict. In addition to these general policy guidelines, the EU also adopted a whole series 
of specific policy documents guiding its policies relevant to peacebuilding: electoral 
assistance and observation; governance and state institutions; governance of natural 
resources; children and gender issues in the context of conflicts; Small Arms and Light 
Weapons; Security Sector Reform; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; state 
fragility; security-development nexus; and mediation. 
 
However, the multiplicity of policy documents adopted in the 2000s did not add to the 
momentum of constructing a comprehensive EU doctrine of peacebuilding. The 
evolution of the EU’s understanding of peacebuilding took place in reaction to the 
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enlargement of the agenda of peacebuilding in the debates of the international 
community, especially at the United Nations. This absorption of external input was also 
geared by the experiences of the EU practices and by challenges faced on the ground. As a 
result, the EU approach to peacebuilding evolved into a myriad of practices and concepts 
that included such diverse types of activities as dialog and mediation (including 
preventive diplomacy), law enforcement and reform of the justice sector, tackling trans-
regional and cross-border threats such as terrorism, illegal immigration, trafficking of 
drugs and arms and human trafficking, piracy, democratization, elections and electoral 
reform, human rights, security aspects of climate change, and governance of natural 
resources in conflict (Council of the European Union 2010a). 
The increasing complexity and diversity of the EU’s peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention activities as well as the changing international context led the EU to reflect on 
the progress in the implementation of the EU programme for prevention of violent 
conflicts. The aim was to prepare a “new, forward-looking document” assessing the 
implementation of the Gothenburg Programme and adapting EU conflict prevention 
policy to the establishment of the European External Action Service (Council of the 
European Union 2010b: 4). Similarly, some policy recommendations also called for 
preparation of a general EU peacebuilding strategy that would overcome conceptual 
diversity and institutional fragmentation (Major and Mölling 2010). However, in June 
2011, the Council confirmed that the Gothenburg Programme “remains a valid policy 
basis for further European Union action in the field of conflict prevention”. Due to the 
lack of political agreement on the future development of the EU peacebuilding and 
conflict prevention policy, the Council provided only modest recommendations 
emphasizing the continuation of existing policy (Council of the European Union 2011). 
In view of this lack of a comprehensive and updated EU peacebuilding strategy and the 
dominant emphasis of institutional and technical aspects of EU peacebuilding activities, it 
is no wonder that there has been rather limited discussion of the very principles and 
objectives of the EU peacebuilding approach. What kind of peace-builder is the EU? What 
kind of peacebuilding approach does it promote? Is there a particular, distinctive EU 
approach to peacebuilding? How should the EU peacebuilding approach be placed in the 
context of debates about peacebuilding in the world? In order to discuss these questions 
and to assess EU peacebuilding policy, this report focuses on EU practices for dealing 
with conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Specifically, the report assesses the main 
patterns of EU peacebuilding practices pursued in the framework of the Instrument for 
Stability (IfS) in light of debates over the strengths and shortcomings of the so-called 
liberal peace consensus. 
The Instrument for Stability was established in 2006 as a continuation of the Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism (created in 2001) and formed part of a package of new instruments 
of EU external action to be implemented during the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013.2
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Despite its employment since the beginning of 2007, the IfS is still hardly mentioned in 
public debates as a relevant instrument of EU foreign policy. Similarly, with a few notable 
exceptions (Gänzle 2009; Hoffmeister 2008) academic literature has devoted rather scant 
attention to analysis of this instrument. This neglect is unfortunate for two basic reasons. 
First, the IfS is one of the few instruments dealing exclusively with crisis prevention and 
management and peacebuilding during different phases of conflict and, therefore, it 
provides a complete view of EU practices in this field. Second, the resources available in 
the framework of the IfS are considerable, e.g. its budget of € 2.068 billion is comparable 
with the EU’s budget for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (€ 1.980 
billion). 
The research for this report is based on in-depth analysis of primary source documents 
from three EU institutions: Council, Parliament and Commission. This desk phase of the 
study was accompanied by a series of anonymous interviews with EU officials and 
representatives involved in the implementation of IfS. 
The next section of the report introduces the main debates about the liberal 
peacebuilding consensus and sets out the analytic criteria framing the assessment of EU 
peacebuilding practices. The third section of the report describes the main functional 
characteristics of the Instrument for Stability, drawing attention to the apparent 
consensus concerning a broad and comprehensive approach to peacebuilding. The fourth 
section analyzes the governance practices observed during the implementation of the IfS 
which confirm the overall consensus on the way the IfS has to be implemented. The fifth 
section assesses qualitatively the use of the different tools offered by the Instrument for 
Stability, pointing out the main patterns of EU peacebuilding practices in light of the 
different models of liberal peace practices. The sixth section presents the particular 
challenge of ensuring the appropriate institutional structures for the IfS within the 
European External Action Service. The final section of the study concludes and sketches 
out various scenarios in the debate about the IfS as a particularly important instrument of 
EU peacebuilding and conflict prevention policy. 
2.  The liberal peacebuilding approach: debates and models 
After the end of the Cold War, the international community intensified peacebuilding 
activities, understood generally as “external interventions that are intended to reduce the 
risk that a state will erupt into or return to war” (Barnett et al. 2006: 37). On the basis of 
this essential understanding of peacebuilding, there is broad scholarly agreement that the 
so-called liberal peacebuilding consensus based on the principles of democratization and 
marketization dominates contemporary thinking about the mode of ensuring peace in 
war-torn societies. The liberal approach to peacebuilding assumes that, in order to 
guarantee peace, a broad range of issues concerning social, economic and institutional 
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needs should be addressed in building stable states. This approach is based on the 
straightforward assumption that states with strong political democratic institutions which 
ensure political representation and a market economy guarantee sustainable economic 
growth and provide basic public goods, are necessary conditions for establishing durable 
peace. Therefore, post-Cold War peacebuilding included a broad range of tasks and 
activities combining challenges of security, economic development, humanitarian 
assistance, and governance and rule of law (Newman et al. 2009: 8-9). 
In addition to practical debates on the efficiency and effectiveness of peacebuilding 
around the world (Page Fortna and Morjé Howard 2008) there is normative awareness of 
the positive and negative consequences of liberal peacebuilding efforts. However, 
scholarly consensus on the liberal peace approach is observed in a widely shared 
assessment that its record and experiences are positive overall, with negligible criticism. 
Critical positions on liberal peace doctrine tend to emphasize the need for actions that 
would avoid shortcomings, disappointments and mistakes, rather than promote fully 
fledged alternative theories and approaches. It is argued that liberal peace simply did 
considerably more good than harm, saving millions of people from lawlessness, 
predation, disease and fear, while “hyper-critical” positions claiming that liberal 
peacebuilding is fundamentally destructive and illegitimate are simply exaggerated and 
unjustified (Paris 2010). Notwithstanding, critiques of liberal peace practices emphasized 
that liberal peacebuilding recurrently reveals three shortcomings: 1) failure to take into 
account domestic local conditions and appropriately engage local stakeholders in 
externally steered peacebuilding efforts; 2) tensions and contradictions between different 
objectives and instruments of peacebuilding as well as different practices of different 
international donors and agents present on the ground; and 3) a tendency to premature 
withdrawal from missions due to both insufficient commitment of resources and unclear 
criteria for assessing successes and failures of peacebuilding (Paris 2010: 347). 
Bearing in mind these critical voices, the underlying tension in the liberal peace 
approach is between arguably universal liberal peace principles and the need to respect 
local communities’ cultures and values. Critical voices argue that universalistic 
assumptions of liberal peace doctrine – premised on standardized and technocratic 
templates of promoting liberal democracy, liberal human rights, market economy values, 
integration into globalization processes – frequently clash with the values and cultures of 
local stakeholders. This confrontation creates the perception of external imposition of 
alien models that do not respect local communities, diminishing the legitimacy of liberal 
peacebuilding efforts and provoking destabilization and return to conflict. However, the 
widely held belief is that these adverse and unintended consequences of liberal 
peacebuilding can be avoided when peacebuilding is context-aware and more 
sophisticated in critically assessing local needs. Consequently, this dichotomy between the 
universal and local is crucial when designing suitable strategies of engagement with third 
actors in the peacebuilding process.  
This dispute focuses on the differences between “external” and “top-down” imposition 
of peacebuilding solutions and engagement with elites and state institutions of third 
states, and “bottom-up” engagement in local community-driven peacebuilding activities, 
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with the latter remaining sensitive to local stakeholders and their everyday practices and 
experiences (Richmond 2009, 2010a). It is argued that the choice between top-down and 
bottom-up engagements may be crucial for the effectiveness and sustainability of 
peacebuilding efforts as well as for normative questions of legitimacy and appropriateness 
of peacebuilding endeavours from the perspective of locally held notions of justice. 
However, a tendency to synthesize both perspectives stresses the need for 
complementarity between top-down and grass-roots bottom-up initiatives in 
peacebuilding (Gawerc 2006; Mac Ginty 2008). 
Richmond (2006) identified within liberal peace several models or generations of 
peacebuilding (Richmond 2010b, 2008). Each model of liberal peace emphasizes specific 
objectives, approaches and means of peacebuilding. A conservative model of liberal peace 
focuses on top-down approaches aimed at guaranteeing security and sovereignty as a 
basis for statebuilding where peace tends to be imposed by military forces and sustained 
by coercive conditionality and dependency measures. It concentrates on delivering 
security, considered a precondition for peace. In the orthodox model of liberal peace, 
although it is also dominated by top-down and state-centric attempts at building the 
institutions for a market-oriented and democratic state, there is, however, some 
understanding of local ownership and culture, visible in some bottom-up practices. In 
this model of peacebuilding elite-level negotiation predominates, but there is greater 
sensitivity to the inclusion of citizens in the peace process and more direct emphasis on 
local ownership and engagement with civil society. In this model, security and institutions 
guaranteeing order are considered to be necessary factors in bringing about lasting peace, 
but there is also awareness of the political and economic functions of state institutions. 
Finally, the emancipatory model of liberal peace aims at emancipation, transcendence of 
identity and sovereignty problems through contextual legitimacy with respect to local 
cultures, extending to the questions of social justice, human security and welfare. This 
approach is critical of universalistic liberal peace ambitions, as it is especially concerned 
with local ownership and critical of top-down coercive, conditionality and dependency 
strategies. It prioritizes a bottom-up approach focusing on the needs as well as rights of 
local communities, with the main concern being delivery of social welfare and justice. In 
this case, the peacebuilding process is shaped by private and social movements supported 
by external donors, but does not emphasize state structures (Richmond 2006: 300-301; 
Richmond 2009: 560-561). These different models of liberal peace might be combined in 
different contexts and might be present to different degrees depending upon the priorities 
and approaches of both external and domestic actors. The presence of each of the models 
may also depend on the specific phase of the conflict cycle. Table 1 presents a simplified 
overview of the differences between the three models of liberal peacebuilding, presenting 
the main elements that will serve as the guidelines for the analysis which follows. 
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Table 1: Gradation of the liberal peace approach to peacebuilding 
 Conservative Orthodox Emancipatory 
Nature of peace Institutional peace Constitutional peace Civil peace 
Objective Liberal market-
oriented states 
Peace and liberal 
states 
Just and durable 
peace 
In focus Order: institutions of 
government, rule of 
law, anti-terrorism 
Democratic liberal 
governance: human 
rights, 
constitutionalism, 
private property 
Justice: welfare and 
social justice, 
identity, rights and 
needs of civil society 
Approach and 
means 
Exclusive, top-down 
activities; coercive, 
conditionality, 
dependence; 
international 
transitional 
administration 
Exclusive and 
inclusive; Mix of top-
down (dominant) and 
bottom up activities; 
cooperative 
custodianship with 
consent and local 
ownership; 
consensual 
negotiations at the 
elite level 
Inclusive, bottom-up 
participation; local 
participation and 
integration 
Rights and 
needs in focus 
Security Political and material Socio-cultural 
Sources of 
insecurity in 
focus 
Armed violence Political and 
economic violence 
Social violence 
Beneficiaries in 
focus 
State elites State elites and some 
organized civil society 
Civil society and local 
groups; society in 
general 
Sources: Prepared by author on the basis of Richmond et al. (2011), Richmond (2006), 
Heathershaw (2008). 
 
Within this framework, reflecting the liberal peace consensus, there are pronounced 
differences in particular approaches to peacebuilding in the practices of international 
donors and agencies (Barnett et al. 2006). Therefore, bearing in mind this diversity, it is of 
the utmost importance to scrutinize critically EU peacebuilding efforts in the light of the 
above-mentioned debates. In general terms, EU peacebuilding practices resemble the 
general principles of liberal peacebuilding. As argued by Richmond et al. (2011), the EU 
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peacebuilding framework places itself between the orthodox liberal peacebuilding and 
emancipatory frameworks. There is tension in EU peacebuilding practices between the 
global peacebuilding approach that focuses on statebuilding practices, and the approach 
that emphasizes a contextual and a locally sensitive form of peacebuilding. On the one 
hand, the EU emphasizes the objectives of promoting classic liberal priorities providing 
security, democratic values and market principles through the institution of the 
Westphalian sovereign state. On the other hand, multiple EU actors are aware of the need 
to take into account the complexity of contexts requiring respect for identities, cultures, 
customs, rights and needs tailored to localized understanding of them and sustaining the 
values of just peace. 
This report approaches the analysis of IfS practices taking into account the three 
models of liberal peacebuilding: conservative, orthodox and emancipatory. The analysis 
of this instrument of EU external actions is undertaken on the basis of questions and 
criteria that determine which of the models is pursued by the EU in practice. The analysis 
of IfS practices will focus on the following benchmarks:  
1. What are the main concerns addressed? (institutions of government and the security 
sector; democratic governance and market institutions; social justice and social 
welfare) 
2. How are the practices of statebuilding of democratic and market institutions 
connected and planned (exclusive top-down, blended exclusive-inclusive top-down 
and bottom-up, inclusive bottom-up practices)? 
3. What needs and rights are addressed in the first place (security, political and 
economic, socio-cultural)? 
4. What sources of insecurity are tackled in the first place (armed violence, political 
violence, economic conditions, and social violence)? 
5. What social groups are the main beneficiaries/stakeholders of the measures funded by 
the IfS (state elites and institutions, state elites and organized civil society, large 
societal groups)? 
3.  The Instrument for Stability: An all-inclusive liberal peace 
mandate? 
There are different categories that can be used in order to describe the phase of the 
crisis/conflict or the preventive action and strategies and tools used. Basically, conflict 
prevention measures can be divided into structural measures and operational measures; 
structural measures address root causes of a given conflict before and after the eruption of 
conflict; operational measures are undertaken in cases when violence seems imminent or 
has already broken out (Dahl Thruelsen 2008). The IfS regulations attempt to tackle 
challenges in different phases of the crisis/conflict cycle as well as issues related to broad 
security challenges throughout the world. However, this seemingly broad scope of the IfS 
regulation is limited by its supplementary and subsidiary character vis-à-vis other 
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external action instruments the EU uses in long-term efforts to tackle the root causes of 
conflicts. In the first place, it is underlined that the aim of IfS crisis response measures is 
to guarantee the conditions for implementation of EU development and cooperation 
policies (Article 1.2(a)). Additionally, all measures adopted within the IfS can be 
employed only when other geographic and thematic instruments of external assistance 
cannot be provided, and they have to be consistent with the strategic framework of 
assistance for partner countries and the objectives of other assistance instruments (Article 
2.1 and 2.2). In the second place, the regulation establishes that the measures should be 
“complementary to, and shall be consistent with, and without prejudice to, measures 
adopted under Title V and Title VI of the EU Treaty” (Article 1.3), hence CFSP and 
Justice, Freedom and Security areas. This emphasis and the negotiation of the regulation 
reveal that the EU peacebuilding and crisis response strategy also places great emphasis 
on long-term assistance addressing possible root causes of conflict (social or economic 
imbalances, lack of democratic legitimacy, etc.) and the Instrument for Stability does not 
reflect the approach of EU peacebuilding in all its dimensions and phases. Within this 
restricted framework, the IfS is not considered to be a unique instrument for dealing with 
peacebuilding and crisis response, but rather an exception to be used in extraordinary 
cases. However, the IfS can be considered an expression of intentions concerning how the 
EU understands the scope of its contribution to peacebuilding efforts worldwide with 
reference to specific crisis response situations as well as structural challenges to security. 
In order to tackle these issues, the IfS establishes two separate components: 1) short-
term measures in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis; and 2) long-term 
measures in the context of stable conditions for cooperation. Each component includes a 
broad mandate allowing different activities that might be undertaken within the IfS. It can 
be argued that the scope of IfS regulation reflects mainly conservative and orthodox 
models of liberal peace, emphasizing a top-down approach to security problems to be 
tackled by state institutions. The inclusion of some discourse on civil society and local 
ownership takes place within a broad consensus on conservative/orthodox models of 
liberal peace existing in the IfS. 
The short-term component of the IfS is designed to respond to crises or emerging 
crises beyond EU borders. However, due to the diverse and unpredictable nature of the 
crisis situations and topics to be addressed, the EU defined them broadly and quite 
flexibly, reflecting awareness of both third states’ stability and security as well as the well-
being of their citizens. According to the IfS Regulations, the characteristics of situations in 
response to which short-term assistance might be provided are: 1) a situation of urgency, 
crisis or emerging crisis; 2) a situation posing a threat to democracy, law and order, the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, or the security and safety of 
individuals; 3) a situation threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to severely 
destabilize the third country or countries concerned; and 4) a situation where the 
Community has invoked the essential clauses of international Agreements in order to 
suspend, partially or totally, cooperation with a third country (Article 3.1). However, 
sixteen specific thematic areas of IfS intervention restrict this flexibility, since the focus is 
on state security and state institutions, while issues concerning democratic governance or 
bottom-up empowerment of civil society are comparatively less pronounced (Table 2).  
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Table 2: Priorities of short-term measures – Article 3 
Conservative Orthodox Emancipatory 
- Interim administration 
- Law and order 
institutions, especially 
control of security system 
- Illicit use of firearms 
- Anti-personal landmines, 
unexploded ordnance or 
explosive remnants of war 
- Demobilization and 
reintegration of former 
combatants (child soldiers 
and female combatants) 
- Restructuring of the 
armed forces 
- Response to natural and 
man-made disasters and 
threats to public health 
- Rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of key 
infrastructure 
- Access and management 
of natural resources 
- Sudden population 
movements 
- Democratic and pluralistic 
state institutions, 
independent judiciary, and 
good governance 
- Respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, 
democracy and the rule of 
law 
- Transitional justice 
- Promotion of confidence-
building, mediation, 
dialogue and reconciliation 
- Development and 
organization of civil society 
(including role of women 
and independent media) 
- Specific needs of women 
and children (including 
gender-based violence) 
- Rehabilitation and 
reintegration of victims of 
armed conflict 
Source: Prepared by author. 
 
While the short-term measures prioritized security and state institutions issues in 
response to crisis, the aim of the long-term component was to “help build capacity both to 
address specific global and trans-regional threats having a destabilising effect and to 
ensure preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations” (Art. 1.2(b)). Similarly, the 
conservative liberal peace approach dominates in this capacity-building component, 
strongly emphasizing security challenges and the need to build states’ capacities in order 
to contend with such challenges. Especially, the priorities of threats to law and order, the 
security and safety of individuals, threats to critical infrastructure and to public health as 
well as risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and 
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nuclear (CBRN) materials or agents concentrate on the aspects that directly touch 
questions of building institutional capabilities. But even the third so-called Partnership 
for Peace component including issues concerning, among others, confidence-building, 
mediation and reconciliation components focuses on building capacity of international 
organizations, states and non-state actors, thus framing this question in terms of a top-
down approach characteristic of the orthodox model of liberal peace (Table 3). 
Table 3: Priorities of long-term measures – Article 4 
Name Beneficiaries Topics addressed 
Trans-national 
security threats 
(Article 4.1) 
Law 
enforcement, 
judicial and civil 
authorities 
Terrorism, organized crime, illicit trafficking of 
people, drugs, firearms and explosive materials 
and other illegal trade and transit issues, threats 
to international transport and energy critical 
infrastructure, major threats to public health. 
Proliferation of 
CBRN  
(Article 4.2) 
Institutions and 
infrastructure 
sensitive for 
CBRN; civilian 
control and crisis 
response 
authorities 
Civilian research, safety practices in civilian 
facilities, establishment of civil infrastructure 
and civilian studies, control of illicit trafficking 
of CBRN, export controls on dual-use goods and 
civilian disaster-preparedness, emergency-
planning, crisis response, and capabilities for 
clean-up measures 
 
Pre- and post-
crisis capacity 
building 
(Peacebuilding 
Partnership) 
(Article. 4.3) 
International 
regional and 
sub-regional 
organizations, 
state and non-
state actors 
Capacity building in the areas of early-warning, 
confidence-building, mediation and 
reconciliation, and post-conflict and post-
disaster recovery 
Source: Prepared by author 
 
As can be observed, the IfS encompasses a broad range of diverse issues considered as 
sources of insecurity and instability that reflects a rather conservative/orthodox approach. 
Notwithstanding, this element of the Regulation was the most difficult to agree upon 
precisely due to controversies concerning how to incorporate the security-sensitive 
questions and delimit the type of topics relevant to peacebuilding during the phases of 
crisis response. Paradoxically, however, EU member states resisted successfully the 
Commission’s proposal to include military and hard security related issues that would 
further reinforce a conservative model of liberal peace. Likewise, despite some member 
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states’ opposition, some particular issues that reflect more bottom-up and non-state 
approaches were also included in the IfS.  
For example, the Commission’s ambition was to concentrate different security-related 
instruments into one IfS Regulation. In the Commission’s proposal of the IfS Regulation, 
Article 308 TEC and Article 203 of the Euratom Treaty were a legal treaty basis of the 
regulation.3 This proposal was driven by two purposes. In the first place, the Commission 
tried to ensure financing of peace-keeping activities which was as extensive as possible, 
going beyond the civilian aspects of crisis response. In the second place, the Commission 
included the references to the Euratom Treaty in order to be able to deal with issues 
concerning nuclear safety as well. However, this proposal was opposed by EU member 
states due to their sensitivity to the transfer of hard-security questions to a non-
intergovernmental field. As a result, both Council and Parliament agreed on the changes 
to the legal basis of the regulation proposal setting them in Articles 179 (development 
cooperation) and 181A TEC (economic, financial and technical cooperation with third 
countries) and eliminating any references to nuclear safety,4
In the case of SALW, the parties agreed on a very carefully drafted text that replaced 
the concept of SALW with “firearms” and restricted the scope of the IfS by excluding 
explicitly “support for measures to combat the proliferation of arms”. However, the 
 placing the IfS in the broader 
context of EU external action. 
The question of support for peace-keeping measures and the inclusion of measures 
related to SALW constituted two main divergences in the design of the short-term 
component of the IfS. In both cases, the Commission’s ambitions were blocked by the EU 
member states. With reference to the peace-keeping aspect, the Commission proposed the 
possibility of supporting military monitoring and peace-keeping or peace-support 
operations of regional and sub-regional organizations and coalitions of states operating 
with United Nations endorsement (European Commission 2004: 17). Several member 
states opposed this proposal since they perceived that this would infringe existing 
relations between the Community pillar and the CFSP pillar (Council of the European 
Union 2004: 4). On the other hand, however, several member states (in particular France, 
United Kingdom and Spain) opposed, this time without success, the inclusion of any 
mention of support “for the efforts undertaken by international and regional 
organizations, state and non-state actors in promoting confidence-building, mediation, 
dialogue and reconciliation” since they argued that the very concepts of “reconciliation” 
or “mediation” were beyond the scope of the Community’s competences (Council of the 
European Union 2006a: 9). 
 
 
3  When the Treaty has not provided the necessary power elsewhere Article 308 of the Treaty entitles the 
Community to “take the appropriate measures” when it is necessary to attain one of the Treaty’s objec-
tives in the course of the operation of the common market. This clause allows questions that are deemed 
necessary by the EU institutions to be addressed in a flexible way. 
4  Article 308 would mean that the role of the European Parliament would be consultative power with little 
possibility of influencing effectively the content of the regulation, while Articles 179 and 181A implied 
that the regulations should be approved in the co-decision procedure. 
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Council and the Commission agreed that until the judgement of the European Court of 
Justice in the case of ECOWAS, the Commission would not adopt measures in this area 
and would revise the regulation in the light of the forthcoming judgment expected to 
divide competencies in this field between the European Commission and the Council 
(Council of the European Union 2006b). Finally, the ECJ judged that the measures against 
the proliferation of SALW could be implemented by the Community under its 
development policy and, therefore, the Commission proposed in 2009 to mention 
explicitly the issue of SALW in the Regulation (European Commission 2009a). 
During negotiation on the long-term component of the IfS regulation two particular 
issues were especially controversial, reflecting the tension between the opposition of some 
member states to including, on the one hand, all security-related issues that enhance a 
conservative approach and, on the other hand, to considering non-state actors as fully-
fledged partners in EU peacebuilding policy that would give emphasis to a less state-
centred approach. In the first place, it was the question of non-proliferation, arms control 
and disarmament and the relation of the IfS to the EU’s Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Strategy. While the topic of nuclear safety was excluded from consideration at an early 
stage, issues relating to weapons of mass destruction, and in particular the inclusion of 
CBRN in the IfS, constituted the most controversial topic until the very end of 
negotiations, when the Council finally decided to include some of the above mentioned 
elements. In the second place, important divergence emerged in relation to the inclusion 
of notions concerning support for civilian peacebuilding capacities promoted by the 
different NGOs. This aim was strongly supported by the European Parliament, but some 
member states (France, Spain, Greece and the United Kingdom) were very reluctant to 
contemplate this question in general and especially the support for international and non-
state actors in the areas of early warning, confidence-building, mediation, and 
reconciliation. Notwithstanding this reluctance and the ambiguous result of the 
negotiations, the Commission declared that the Peacebuilding Partnership would, in 
practice, be implemented taking into account the view of NGOs lobbying in favour of 
these measures. 
Alongside the framing of the IfS where the conservative/orthodox approach to 
peacebuilding dominates, regulations concerning beneficiaries and modalities of support 
create opportunities for less state-concentrated activities. The EU usually acts as a source 
of material resources for the activities of other actors, since it requires some 
intermediaries that implement the activities on the ground on its behalf. In this respect, 
the IfS allows funding for public bodies, private entities, non-state actors and natural 
persons from EU member states and third countries as well as international 
organizations, including UN bodies (Article 10.3). All these actors may propose, design, 
benefit from and implement a very broad range of measures, including technical 
assistance projects, grants and budget support. In practice, IfS funds can be employed in 
order to cover the costs of external experts coming from non-EU or EU Member States’ 
entities providing services (e.g. advice, technical assistance) or transferring the resources 
to the treasuries of beneficiary countries in order to supply the required materials in kind. 
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The budget of IfS, set at the level of € 2.062 billion, is divided between different 
priorities. For the short term priority of crisis response, the budget appropriation is 73% 
of this general budget (€ 1.505 billion). For the three remaining long term priorities the 
budget has been established as follows: about € 144 million (7% of the budget) for the 
priority concerning threats to law and order; € 309 million (15% of the budget) for risk 
mitigation and preparedness related to CBRN materials or agents; and € 144 (5% of the 
budget) million for pre- and post-crisis capacity building. However, the overall budget of 
the IfS suffered a considerable setback, since in 2008 it was decided to reduce it by € 240 
million in order to finance the Food Facility, a new EU external action instrument aimed 
at alleviating the consequences of soaring food prices in developing countries. 
4.  Decision-making and accountability 
EU external assistance projects are implemented traditionally on the basis of long-term, 
mid-term and short-term programming documents. However, in the case of IfS, the 
standard system of programming is adapted to its inherent characteristics of an 
instrument of rapid reaction to crisis or emerging crisis. Until the creation of the EEAS, 
there were two processes of inter-institutional decision-making and political 
accountability: 1) a special system put in place for short term measures in response to 
situations of crisis or emerging crisis (Article 3) implemented through Exceptional 
Assistance Measures; and 2) the normal system of the long-term component, 
implemented under Article 4 of the IfS Regulation in the context of stable conditions for 
cooperation. The functioning of both systems reflects, in practice, an overall consensus of 
different EU actors on implementation of IfS measures.5
4.1  Short-term component 
 In other words, the 
conservative/orthodox liberal peace approach that emerged during negotiation of the IfS 
Regulation described in the previous section is sustained by a broad institutional 
consensus during its implementation. 
In the case of short-term measures, the EU adopted a flexible approach in the process of 
identification and approval of crisis response measures, which according to the 
Commission, allows for “rapid decision-making, which is absolutely necessary in the field 
of crisis management” (European Commission 2009b: 29). Therefore, criteria used in 
project identification are very general: 1) the eligibility of the measures, meaning the 
actual existence of a crisis, complementary character of the measures, and synergies with 
other EU crisis response interventions; 2) the feasibility of the measures assessed on the 
basis of sufficient time available for sound preparation of the action and availability of a 
solid implementing partner; and 3) the political appropriateness of the action (European 
Commission 2010a: 3). The Commission clarified that the short-term component might 
 
 
5  Challenges related to the setting up of the EEAS are presented in the sixth section of the report. 
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be mobilized in the case of “a major new political crisis or natural disaster, or a window of 
opportunity to pre-empt a crisis or an opportunity to advance conflict resolution, or the 
need to secure the conditions for the delivery of EC assistance”, but emphasized also that 
on the basis of these criteria there is no automaticity in mobilizing IfS funds and that 
judgment is made case by case (European Commission 2008a: 4-5). Additionally, an 
inclusive process characterizes the phase of project identification since: “ideas for new IfS 
programmes are often developed, in a flexible manner, through discussions with a series of 
actors within the EU (…), or within the wider international community (beneficiary 
country authorities, UN system agencies, bilateral), or with civil society actors” (European 
Commission 2008b: 5, emphasis original). Therefore, the project proposals might have 
been planned by staff in the Commission or its Delegations in third countries or received 
from NGOs and international organizations. After the assessment of proposals and 
formal approval of the Commission’s decision, Delegations responsible for the day-to-day 
management (e.g. negotiation of contracts with local partners and monitoring of project 
implementation) are decisive in the implementation. For example, they implemented in 
situ 19 out of 20 decisions on Exceptional Assistance Measures adopted in 2009. 
However, the broad autonomy of the Commission was constrained by the obligation 
of cooperation with other institutions. The EU Member States and the European 
Parliament decided to establish an exceptionally strict system of control guaranteeing 
continued access to information on the activities developed in the IfS framework, 
allowing for permanent political guidance and general accountability by other 
institutions. Before adopting or renewing Exceptional Assistance Measures or introducing 
“substantial changes” to these measures, the Commission had to inform the Council 
regularly about the planning of assistance in general and especially as refers the nature, 
objectives and financial amount. In practice, the Commission briefed on a monthly basis 
the Political and Security Committee on the planned short-term measures of the IfS and 
the progress of the activities. As was recognized in 2009, “this arrangement has worked 
well and to the satisfaction of both the Council and the Commission” (European 
Commission 2009b: 33). 
In addition to this continuous control of the Council, after the adoption of Exceptional 
Assistance Measures the Commission had to report in the Parliament. Due to the 
insistence of the European Parliament, the Commission decided to provide the 
Parliament with the same information as the Council. On the basis of monthly notes, the 
Parliament comments on the measures. Precisely, the opinions of the Parliament reflect 
the most important critique of the IfS measures, but instead of its specific content the 
Parliament has concentrated on procedural and coherence aspects. Initially, a flexible 
approach to project selection raised criticism. As stated by the rapporteur of the 
Parliament, it is not always clear what the selection criteria for IfS projects are, whether 
there were policy or donor coordination concerns at the time of adopting a decision and 
what actors and on what basis they were chosen for the implementation of the measures 
(European Parliament 2009: 11). As a result, secondly, the Parliament has raised questions 
of the suitability of the IfS as a source of funding for specific measures, suggesting that in 
some cases the proposed measures should be funded in the framework of other 
geographical instruments or humanitarian aid (especially, in the case of disaster recovery) 
The European Union Peacebuilding Approach 15 
 
 
and has been concerned about the continuity of IfS measures under other geographical 
instruments.6
4.2 Long-term component 
 
The long-term measures of the IfS are implemented on the basis of a conventional 
programming cycle: Strategy Papers with attached Multi-annual Indicative Programmes 
and Annual Action Programmes adopted for each issue area. The long-term component 
is programmed and implemented by the Commission with the involvement of the EU 
member states, which are consulted before the formal adoption of a decision by the 
Commission on the content of all programming documents in the framework of so-called 
management comitology procedure, usually applied in the implementation of 
programmes with substantial budgetary implications.7
The practice of the IfS Committee also reflects overall consensus on the approach to 
the implementation of these measures. Therefore, the main problems with the 
implementation of the IfS had to do with procedural controversies and delays. On the one 
hand, due to a disagreement on the languages to be used in the comitology procedures, 
the Committee did not adopt the rules of procedure and, as a result, some member states 
(Spain and Italy) refused to participate in the voting unless the Rules of Procedure were 
approved, making voting impossible during meetings because of the lack of a quorum. 
This lack of a quorum was also related to the permanent absence of many Member States 
representatives. However, a common practice was that, after the meetings, the 
Commission launched a written procedure of voting, usually concluding with a 
favourable opinion by unanimous agreement of Member States.
 
8 Even in the case of 
quorum during the meetings of the Committee, but in view of the continuous abstention 
of Spain and Italy, the Commission preferred written procedure “so as to ensure an 
unanimous adoption of decision” (European Commission 2009c: 1).9
This generally unproblematic approval of measures by the Member States reflects 
general agreement on the actions proposed by the Commission as a result of a 
considerable convergence of views. The most important debates and deliberations took 
place in 2007 when the Commission presented the first Thematic Strategy Paper for the 
period 2007-2011 and the Indicative Programme 2007-2008 and the Member States 
 
 
 
6  There are no official replies from the Commission, which usually keeps silent on the comments of the 
Parliament. 
7  Comitology procedure is applied in order to preserve Council’s oversight of the implementation of rules 
by the Commission. 
8  The exception was the voting on the Interim Response Program in the International Civilian Office in 
Kosovo in March 2009 in which two member states (Spain and Greece) abstained due to their position on 
the independence of Kosovo. 
9  The IfS did not adopt the rules of procedure, but the usual silent procedure has been introduced. It means 
that the Commission sends to the committee members the proposed measures on which their opinion is 
sought. Tacit agreement to the proposal is considered to exist when a member state does not express its 
opposition or abstention before the deadline. 
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demanded substantive amendments to these documents. Any further debates on IfS 
programming documents resulted in minor amendments to the draft document prepared 
by the Commission, with previous substantial input from the Member States. Similarly, 
the Annual Action Programmes for each of the three long term priorities were adopted 
without any substantial problems since they already reflected the recommendations of 
Member States’ experts (European Commission 2009d)10 and in very few cases the 
Commission had to redraft the projects considerably in view of the opinion of Member 
States.11
 
 
10  More than 50 national experts visited more than 20 potential partner countries in the framework of the 
so-called Expert Support Facility in order to “assess the scope, needs and conditions for cooperation and 
assistance under the IfS” (European Commission 2009a: 28). This national expertise assured a smooth 
process of drafting and agreeing on the Multi-annual Indicative Programme. 
11  The most far-reaching modifications to the projects’ content took place in September 2010 when the 
Commission had to revise four of five projects in the area of risk mitigation and preparedness relating to 
CBRN materials or agents (European Commission 2010b: 3-4). 
 For example, even after the ECJ judgment, the question of the Commission’s 
competencies in the field of SALW continued to be very sensitive for some EU member 
states, but they did not obstruct the implementation of these projects. As a result of this 
overall intra-EU agreement, the only project that was cancelled was the EU contribution 
to the nuclear fuel bank under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) due to the delay in establishing formally this initiative. 
According to the comitology procedure, the European Parliament has scrutiny powers 
and the Commission should inform the Parliament on committee proceedings on a 
regular basis, including information, consultation and dialogue on Strategy Papers. In this 
procedure, the Commission presents proposals of programming documents to the 
European Parliament and the Council at the same time. This practice enables the 
Parliament to express its views before the Committee has adopted a position. 
Furthermore, after the Committee adopts a position on proposed measures, the 
Parliament has 30 days to object to the decision on a draft. Hypothetically, the Parliament 
can object through a resolution when it considers that a planned decision is not fully in 
line with the legal basis. However, the adoption of the resolution is a cumbersome 
procedure and would have in fact limited impact on the measures, and thus the 
Parliament never uses this possibility. As a result, the European Parliament, only raised 
three issues in 2007 when commenting on the draft Strategy Paper: It praised the 
reduction of funding for the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and 
the Science Centre in Kiev; expressed its concern about the implications of EU funding 
for the African Union’s African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), 
based in Algiers; and it asked about insufficient funding of SALW-related activities in the 
transitory phase of mainstreaming this priority in the geographic instruments. In addition 
to this particular opinion, support provided in order to enhance capacities in the field of 
terrorism is noted continuously with criticism by the European Parliament, worried that 
the EU’s support might be counterproductive in countries with poor human rights 
records. 
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5. The liberal peace consensus in the practices of  
EU peacebuilding: projects and initiatives 
5.1  Implementation of the short-term component 
As was explained in section 3 of the report, measures under Article 3 referring to crisis or 
emerging crisis were planned as operational measures aimed at providing rapid and 
technical response in the context of increasing tension. The Commission, during the 
period 2007-2010, supported in total 116 individual actions worth € 480 million in more 
than 50 countries all over the world.12 According to the annual reports, by the end of 
2010, the Commission had adopted 69 large-scale Exceptional Assistance Measures in 37 
countries (including Kosovo and Occupied Palestinian territories) and one measure 
supporting capacity building for crisis response in the African Union.13
As a general rule, the Commission commits all budget appropriations every year and, 
according to the Commission’s data presented in annual reports, these budget 
commitments are transferred very quickly to the implementing actors and beneficiaries. 
The ratio of commitments/contracts and contracted commitments/disbursement, which 
illustrates the status of the implementation of the activities, was very high (especially, in 
comparison to other geographic and thematic external assistance instruments). Most of 
these projects acquired the status of completed, and in many cases the EU has been able to 
implement activities at a lower cost than had been initially planned. Financial flows also 
suggest a fast process of decision-making during the adoption and implementation of 
these measures. The average period between the initial needs assessment and the 
financing of the first actions on the ground was usually two to three months, while in the 
case of traditional geographical assistance instruments this period is about 24 months. In 
some case, however, this period has been excessively long (e.g. 12 months in Nepal, 10 
months in Kyrgyzstan, 9 months in Peru), but, on the other hand, in several cases, the 
Commission recognized that formal decisions on launching the projects had been 
adopted after the actual beginning of activities on the ground. On the other hand, 
 In addition, the 
Commission adopted so-called IfS Facilities in order to provide support to small-scale 
and short-notice actions in the following areas: 1) Facilities for urgent actions involving 
Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation and Reconciliation for the benefit of third 
countries in crisis situations; 2) a Conflict Resources Facility, including support for the 
Kimberly Process; and 3) a Facility for urgent actions involving support for Tribunals of 
International Character and Transitional Justice Initiatives. In the framework of these 
special facilities, the EU adopted 47 small-scale measures contributing assistance for 
security sector reform, assessment missions before large-scale support, electoral missions, 
mediation and transitional justice initiatives. 
 
 
12  For more details see European Commission (2010d, 2011a). 
13  Additionally, as a follow up to previous Exceptional Assistance Measures, the EU adopted two Interim 
Response Programmes in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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however, the Commission recognized that due to different problems on the ground 
several measures had to be prolonged beyond the initially planned period. 
Most of these projects have been implemented through United Nations programmes 
and agencies (37% of funds), international and national NGOs (28% of funds), 
International Organizations (17% of funds), private operators (4.5% of funds), EU 
member states’ agencies (10.5% of funds) and governments of beneficiary countries (3% 
of funds) (European Commission, 2011b: 8). In most cases, the role of the EU institutions 
and officials in the EU Delegations is limited to the supervision of their implementation 
by these actors. The EU has to involve either UN agencies due to their actual presence in 
the field and existing structures able to deliver response, or NGOs due to their expertise in 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding (European Commission, 2010c: 4). Finally, as 
recognized by some EU officials, implementation through other international 
organizations reduces risks associated with project failure and, consequently, the political 
and personal responsibility of European Commission officials. As a result, however, EU 
provision of funds to other international organizations, frequently presented as a case of 
implementation of its commitment to “effective multilateralism”, is rather a need that has 
been made a virtue and a suitable policy option involving delegation of the 
implementation of EU policy in view of the organization’s own limitations. 
Thematically, the measures supported by the EU addressed very diverse problems 
related to tensions and crises affecting countries in different geographical areas. Drawing 
from the analysis of Exceptional Assistance Measures that directly addressed situations of 
crisis or conflict, the EU usually engaged in cases of protracted crisis and conflicts 
characterized by continued tension and sporadic use of violence. There are in fact only 
two conflicts that emerged in the same year as the decision to adopt IfS measures: 
conflicts between the government and the opposition in Moldova and Peru. On the other 
hand, the EU usually acted in countries affected by several crises and conflicts at different 
stages, but frequently avoided engaging in situations of severe crisis characterized by 
repeated use of violence in an organized way, or war.14
 
 
14  The definition of severe crisis is from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2010: 
88). 
 Indeed, the countries with the 
most complex situation were Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar, Lebanon, Indonesia, DR 
Congo, Colombia and Chad, but even in these cases the EU engaged in the stage of 
stabilization or, as in case of Sri Lanka, focused on providing humanitarian aid to civilians 
affected by the war. As a result, there are numerous projects in countries affected by 
different tensions or crises, which thematically do not always directly tackle their causes 
or effects, but focus on some aspects of their context or simply other, less problematic 
tensions on the ground. Projects in Afghanistan supporting the reform of the justice 
sector, two measures in Bosnia-Herzegovina dealing with explosive remnants of war, two 
measures in the DR of Congo that supported the establishment of security bodies, or a 
measure in Yemen aimed at empowering the government and civil society in order to 
address migration flows are examples of activities that focused on problems different 
from the actual crises or conflicts in which the beneficiary countries are involved or 
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affected. In some cases, the IfS measures provided accompanying support for ESDP 
missions deployed in those countries (DR of Congo, Afghanistan, Kosovo) or adjacent 
areas (Somalia and Kenya). The EU funded eight measures addressing the consequences 
of natural disasters (in Bangladesh, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Peru) and even 
offered expert support for an HIV-AIDS strategy in Libya. While it cannot be denied that 
these measures may have positive indirect effects on these conflicts, their rationale is not 
always clear and straightforward. 
Notwithstanding this thematic diversity of projects, they can be assessed in terms of 
criteria characterizing different models of liberal peacebuilding presented in Table 1. The 
description of these projects included in the annual report of the European Commission 
makes it possible to associate their characteristics with these different ideal models of 
liberal peace. Measures’ descriptions show that IfS practices frequently combine modes of 
action of different ideal models within the liberal peace paradigm. The analysis of 69 
projects addressing some type of crisis situation (including disaster recovery) reveals that 
the IfS practice of providing assistance in crisis response merge conservative and ortho-
dox models of liberal peace: the approach of 18 measures can be characterized as conserv-
ative; 23 orthodox (including all disaster recovery measures); 24 measures usually reflect 
traits of both conservative and orthodox models; and only 4 measures can be defined as 
emancipatory (Figure 1). 
 
Source: Prepared by author 
 
The analysis of five criteria (concerns, approach, sources of insecurity, rights and needs 
addressed, main beneficiaries) employed to assess the measures from the point of view of 
a liberal peace paradigm offers a nuanced and comprehensive summary of EU practices in 
response to crisis and emerging tensions. Indeed, the distribution of different patterns 
shows that the combination of different conservative/orthodox practices of liberal peace 
dominates in all dimensions. As can be observed in Figure 2, the dominant concerns that 
were addressed in the framework of these projects fall within the scope of the conservative 
Figure 1. Liberal peace models: short-term measures
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type of liberal peace. In the measures frequently addressing several topics, the issues 
concerning problems with institutions of government and the security sector appeared in 
36 and 17 cases respectively, while democratic governance and transitional justice 
characterizing orthodox liberal peace were included in 15 and 7 cases respectively. The 
remaining concerns addressed in the projects cannot be associated directly with any 
particular liberal peace model without further analysis of other criteria. In effect, in 
contrast to some expectations of securitization of EU external migration policy, four 
projects addressing migration challenges were based on activities and approaches that 
most resemble emancipatory model of liberal peace. In other cases, however, the IfS 
measures supported security forces in managing migration as well as problems arising 
from displaced persons as a result of conflicts. 
Source: Prepared by author 
 
Taking into account other criteria, there is also a proportional distribution of the patterns 
characterising conservative and orthodox models of liberal peace, leading in practice to a 
general merging of both models. In the first place, almost half of projects adopted a top-
down approach to intervention where the origin of intervention is situated at the level of 
state administration. The projects mixing top-down and bottom-up activities, or focused 
only on bottom-up actions appear to be in only 35% and 16% of IfS short-term measures 
respectively. However, this conservative approach to delivering assistance was frequently 
shared with concerns about sources of insecurity corresponding to orthodox models of 
liberal peace. Although armed violence appeared in 32 measures as a source of insecurity 
addressed, almost the same role was played by political and economic sources of 
insecurity (34 and 23 projects respectively). Additionally, in many cases, armed violence 
and political or economic concerns appeared in conjunction with each other. 
Figure 2: Short-term measures: dominant concerns addressed 
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By contrast, more measures attempted to address political and economic rights and needs 
associated with an orthodox type of liberal peace than security concerns characterizing 
the conservative option: political and economic rights and needs were addressed in 39 
and 34 IfS measures respectively, while there were 25 measures addressing security rights 
and needs. This supremacy of orthodox liberal peace needs and rights is balanced by a 
much stronger emphasis on beneficiaries typical of the conservative model. State elite and 
institutions could be identified as direct beneficiaries in 50 projects, while organized civil 
society was considered only in 17 measures. Surprisingly, broad social collectives (e.g. 
refugees, people affected by natural disasters or families of combatants) were included as 
the main beneficiaries of projects in 27 cases. However, this focus on large social groups 
does not imply inclusion of the emancipatory type of liberal peace models in IfS short-
term crisis response measures, but a tendency to channel support and aid to society 
through state institutions and top-down approaches. 
Figure 3: Short-term measures: projects’ 
approaches 
Figure 4: Short-term measures: Sources  
of insecurity addressed 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Short-term measures: rights and 
needs addressed 
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5.2  Implementation of the long-term component15
The long term component of the IfS is aimed at tackling and counteracting diverse 
structural thematic security risks and threats worldwide. The framing of this long-term 
component of the IfS stresses a rather conservative approach to liberal peace, since it 
focuses especially on capacity building of state institutions in dealing with security 
questions. In line with this approach, this long term component, specified in the 
Thematic Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2011, emphasized as the strategic and policy 
framework the European Security Strategy and three further priorities: implementation of 
the EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; counteracting 
global and trans-regional threats; and building capacity for effective crisis response 
(European Commission 2007). 
Table 4: Themes of long-term IfS measures specified in Indicative Programmes 
 
Priority Thematic domains of projects 
Reduction of illicit trans-
regional flows 
- Fighting against crime on drug trafficking routes 
- Fight against the proliferation of SALW 
- Maritime security and safety along critical maritime 
routes 
- Capacity building in regions affected by terrorism 
Risk mitigation and 
preparedness relating to 
CBRN materials and agents 
- Capacity-building activities and learning activities 
referring to illicit trafficking of CBNR and border 
monitoring  
- Bio-safety and bio-security, export controls on dual-use 
goods 
- Redirecting of former weapons of mass destruction 
scientists. 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
In line with the conservative model of liberal peace present in the IfS Regulation, all 
projects addressing structural transnational security challenges focused on strengthening 
the institutional capacity of governments, especially law and order institutions and 
security bodies worldwide, including several international organizations. These IfS 
projects aim fundamentally at improving the capacities of beneficiary national 
administrations and international organizations in facing security challenges, mainly 
 
 
15  This part of the report is based on the analysis of Annual Action Programmes as well as semi-structured 
anonymous interviews. 
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through providing equipment and training. For example, the reduction of illicit trans-
regional flows focuses on capacity-building and provision of equipment for laboratories 
and law enforcement bodies as well as resources such as information, know-how, best 
practices and training of personnel. 
In the context of the conservative approach to dealing with transnational challenges 
through state institutions of law and order, some EU officials consider that the most 
innovative approach to capacity building in beneficiary countries is sensitivity to the 
demands and needs expressed by beneficiaries themselves. Therefore, instead of 
traditional top-down assumptions about the needs of third actors, the EU adopted in 
some cases a bottom-up approach in order to detect beneficiaries’ needs and engage them 
in sustainable cooperation. For example, in order to guarantee greater involvement of 
target countries and sustainability of measures, the EU is attempting to apply a bottom-up 
approach in its flagship project CBRN Centre of Excellence for Risk Mitigation. This 
project was conceived as a decentralized network of regional initiatives (South East Asia, 
Southern Caucasus/Ukraine, Central Asia, Middle East, Gulf and Mediterranean region, 
Africa), clustering individual countries with the aim of helping them to build institutional 
capacity and implement strategies of CBRN risk mitigation. These regional initiatives 
from the bottom-up perspective aim at identifying specific needs and providing tailor 
made assistance in such areas as export control issues, illicit trafficking, bio-safety and 
bio-security, as well as engagement of the scientific community.  
Other measures considered as innovative approaches attempt to design projects at 
inter-regional level, e.g. linking activities of state law and order institutions in West 
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean in connection with the fight against organized 
crime on the cocaine route as well as supporting the fight against the illicit accumulation 
and trafficking of firearms in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. Additionally, 
support for the availability of a database developed by Interpol for reporting lost and 
stolen firearms to 188 Interpol member countries is envisaged within the framework of 
the project concerning firearms and explosive materials. 
As a result, the often-referred to post-national EU is trying to reinforce state 
institutions in order to deal with questions considered to be transnational security 
challenges originating from non-state actors and entities separated from concrete 
territories and states. This tension between the nature of issues to be tackled and the 
means that are mobilized can be explained by the way the projects are identified, 
programmed and implemented. In all these phases, EU Member States occupy the 
dominant position and shape the content of long-term projects. Similarly, consultations 
with beneficiaries, which might be considered examples of a bottom-up approach, focus 
on third state institutions of law and order. 
During each phase of the project cycle there is direct involvement of different actors 
from the EU, including Member States and institutions, international organizations and 
beneficiary countries. According to the Commission’s officials, the engagement of 
different stakeholders is crucial in order to identify and appropriately implement the 
projects for several reasons: sensitivity of EU member states in dealing with security-
related issues; considerable competition of private and public actors in providing security-
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related products; and the very limited pool of specialized experts ready to provide their 
input to the projects. In this context, the so-called Expert Support Facility, which 
mobilizes experts from EU Member States that assist the Commission in identifying 
programmes and projects, has also been welcomed by EU officials. Experts for member 
states carry out studies and fact-finding missions in potential beneficiary countries in 
order to assess the suitability of proposed measures. As has been stressed by Commission 
officials, EU activities aimed at enhancing the capacities of beneficiary countries fall 
within a very sensitive domain and, therefore, might sometimes be perceived as too 
intrusive if not subjected to consultation well in advance with beneficiary countries by 
their peers from EU member states.16
Due to these expertise constraints, many IfS projects constituted initially a follow-up 
of activities developed previously in the framework of geographic assistance instruments 
(TACIS and MEDA in particular). For example, the EU supported a follow up of such 
activities as the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science 
and Technology Centre in Ukraine aimed at redirecting former weapons scientists from 
 
This involvement of national experts and consultation with stakeholders influenced 
the definition of approaches and thematic priorities of action. Experts from member 
states contributed to shaping projects concerning illicit trafficking and border 
monitoring, critical maritime routes, the fight against organized crime on cocaine routes 
as well as projects addressing bio-safety and bio-security. Participation of national experts 
also reflected the political interest of several member states in approaching particular 
problems from the EU level. For example, the projects in the field of export controls of 
dual use goods reflect the interest of Germany in ensuring a follow up of earlier projects 
through a common approach to this politically and commercially sensitive issue area, and 
Spain, for example, was especially supportive regarding projects related to the trafficking 
of cocaine. 
The implementation of these projects exposed a critical limitation faced by EU 
institutions: too few staff engaged in the project management cycle and a shortage of 
human resources and expertise in demanding and resource-intensive areas requiring 
advanced equipment and technology as well as high-level expert skills. The dominant 
view is that the services in the Commission (and now in the EEAS as well) dealing with 
these projects are understaffed and that project management within the requirements of 
financial regulation imposes a considerable bureaucratic workload on them. For example, 
the implementation of the Peacebuilding Partnership in support of non-state actors 
emphasized the permanent shortage of available staff in the DG RELEX to manage the 
very demanding and time-consuming process of project selection (Bayne and Trolliet 
2009). As a result, the Commission changed its approach to the method of funding non-
state actors, decentralizing the management of grants to the level of EU Delegations. 
 
 
16  Despite this dominance of national experts, some projects and ideas benefited considerably from intra-
Commission expertise drawn from the Joint Research Centre that provided scientific expertise, the inter-
Commission processes of drafting and agreeing on particular projects and the geographical desks of DG 
RELEX. 
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the former Soviet Union to civilian and peaceful activities developed since the mid-1990s; 
a project in support of activities aimed at combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
radioactive materials in selected former Soviet Union countries; export control of dual-
use goods in the Russian Federation; and a network for the control of health and security 
threats and other bio-security risks in the Mediterranean region and South-East Europe. 
As a result of problems concerning EU expertise and staff, numerous projects have 
been implemented by the specialized agencies and bodies of the United Nations and other 
international organizations, EU Member States’ agencies as well as ministries and 
agencies of beneficiary countries. There are almost no EU staff engaged in project 
implementation at the expert level, and the EU officials concentrate basically on the 
supervision of implementation of the contracted projects. Therefore, the EU is perceived 
more as an intermediate agency providing resources and supervising project 
implementation than an actor on its own. Consequently, from this point of view the EU 
does not favour any specific approach to the implementation of security sensitive projects, 
but makes use of already existing opportunities provided by other actors. 
In view of these structural limitations, the implementation of the component covering 
crisis response and preparedness under the umbrella of Peacebuilding Partnership has 
been considered a structural complement to the crisis response activities with the aim of 
building and strengthening the capacity of non-state actors, international organizations as 
well as relevant Member States’ agencies, in the areas of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding. The constitution of this component of the IfS was regarded as a way of 
overcoming the limitations of state-centred measures of EU peacebuilding practices and 
possibly enhancing alternatives to conservative approaches to liberal peace. Therefore, the 
approach adopted in the implementation of this priority was actor-driven, focusing on 
the needs of specific groups of actors in view of their potential role in peacebuilding 
activities worldwide. The Commission executed activities directed at civil society actors 
with the aim of stimulating their capacity-building projects in the field of peacebuilding 
and conflict prevention. Moreover, the Commission promoted the establishment of a 
stable platform of interactions with civil society organizations active in the field through 
the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) – a network of organizations (NGOs 
and think tanks) promoting peacebuilding policies among decision-makers in the EU. 
However, the bulk of Peacebuilding Partnership was also directed at state actors. For 
example, the IfS funded activities of EU Member States’ agencies supporting training for 
police participating in civilian stabilization missions, including police officers from EU 
Member States, non-EU countries contributing to CSDP missions and African countries, 
as well as civilian experts for crisis management and stabilization missions. However, as 
recognized by some EU officials, these efforts have been of little relevance to date since it 
was observed that, for example, very few of the 1800 trainees in the field of civilian crisis 
management participated in the EU missions. Additionally, UN bodies and international 
organizations (regional and sub-regional) themselves benefited from the capacity building 
support provided by the IfS. For example, the EU provided special grants to international 
organizations (especially the UN) with the aim of enhancing their capacities in the area of 
early warning and early recovery, especially concerning actions aimed at elaborating 
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methodologies for post conflict and post disaster needs assessment as well as addressing 
the issue of natural resources management and conflict. This phenomenon of turning the 
EU into an international financial agency providing funds for capacity-building of other 
international organizations became a source of concern of several actors following the 
implementation of the IfS. As put by one of the EU officials, “it makes no sense to fund 
UN mediation capabilities at the moment when the EU has no capacity in this field at all 
and needs it desperately” (Interview, Brussels, 4 May 2011). 
6.  European External Action Service: towards a conservative 
liberal peace paradigm? 
The established ways of implementing IfS actions, exemplifying the EU’s implicit 
orthodox and conservative approaches in the liberal peacebuilding doctrine, may be 
modified significantly after the launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 
January 2011. According to many opinions, the establishment of this novel body 
challenges the continuity of the accumulated practical knowledge for dealing with crisis 
situations and security problems. There are fears that the possible outcome of the 
establishment of the EEAS might limit the liberal peace paradigm of EU peacebuilding to 
its most conservative version, based on CSDP missions establishing law and order 
institutions. Therefore, the issue at stake in the establishment of EEAS is who will be in 
charge of the peacebuilding policy and, in consequence, what rationale and institutional 
culture will dominate IfS practices in the future. 
Among many controversial questions during the establishment of the EEAS, one of 
the most important was the transfer of officials and functions from the General 
Secretariat of the Council and the Commission to the EEAS and, especially, the position 
of the external assistance instruments in this new structure. The compromise achieved 
was that almost all staff in the departments and functions from the Directorate General 
for External Relations, External Service (Delegations) and several functional units of the 
Directorate General Development would be transferred to the EEAS, with the exception 
of the staff responsible for the financial management of external assistance instruments. It 
was agreed in the EEAS Decision that “the management of the Union’s external 
cooperation programmes is under the responsibility of the Commission”, but “without 
the prejudice to the respective roles of the Commission and of the EEAS in 
programming” (Official Journal of the European Union 2010, Article 9.1). Additionally, 
the High Representative shall ensure overall political coordination, unity, consistency and 
effectiveness of the Union’s external action, “in particular” through external assistance 
instruments. The division of tasks in a new programming cycle is as follows: the EEAS, 
responsible for the early stage of programming, will contribute to and prepare the 
Commission’s strategic decisions, e.g. Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative 
Programmes. Furthermore, both the High Representative and the EEAS should work with 
the members and service of the Commission throughout the whole cycle of 
programming, planning and implementation of the instruments. On the other hand, 
however, all proposals for decisions should be prepared following the Commission’s 
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procedures, and it is the Commission that formally adopts the decisions once they are 
submitted by the EEAS and will be responsible for later stages of programming and 
implementation on the ground. 
Some aspects of the implementation of the IfS in this new institutional setting have 
been regulated specifically. The Council’s decision confirmed the existence of two 
separate procedures for implementation of the IfS. As a result, the long-term component 
of the Instrument follows the procedure described above for cooperation between the 
EEAS and the Commission during programming, and the Commission’s services 
responsible for the implementation of the IfS are located in the DG EuropeAid 
Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO). However, the short-term rapid crisis 
response component of the Instrument was placed under the direct responsibility of the 
High Representative and the EEAS, albeit with two caveats. First, financial 
implementation is the responsibility of the Commission “under the authority of the High 
Representative in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission” and, second, the 
department of the Commission in charge of the implementation of this component “shall 
be co-located with the EEAS” (Ibid, Article 9.6). 
Following this decision, the Commission created a so-called Foreign Policy 
Instrument Service (FPIS) in charge of the implementation of the IfS short-term 
component and Peacebuilding Partnership.17 The creation of the FPIS staffed, among 
others, with crisis response planners with regional or thematic expertise and financial 
administrators resulted, however, in the relocation of four former DG RELEX units 
outside the EEAS structures (European Commission 2010d: 17).18
The transfer of the former DG RELEX staff responsible for implementation of the IfS 
short term component to the FPIS as well as its unclear attachment to the new Service has 
been criticized by the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). They argued that 
this is a case of non-fulfilment of the commitments of the High Representative/Vice-
President as regards the creation of “an appropriate structure” in the field of crisis 
management and peace building (High Representative/Vice-President of the European 
Commission 2010). According to the MEPs, one of the elements in fulfilling this 
commitment should be the incorporation into the EEAS of the staff previously engaged in 
 This decision reflected 
the political sensitivity and specificity of the IfS since, in the view of some, the FPIS “will 
look after Commission money that cannot be transferred to the EEAS and should not be 
conventionally swept into” the DG DEVCO (European Voice 2010). However, the 
decision affecting the IfS also reflected broader controversies concerning EU 
peacebuilding activities after the creation of the EEAS: the question of appropriate 
expertise and the organizational position of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding 
in the new Service. 
 
 
17  This service is also responsible for the implementation of actions under the CFSP Budget, the Instrument 
for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, communication and public diplomacy actions, and elec-
tion observation missions. 
18  In the organization chart of the EEAS, the FPIS has been distinguished as a separate European Commis-
sion service reporting directly to HRVP. 
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the planning and programming of the crisis response measures of the IfS (Brantner et al. 
2011). In order to pressure the Commission, the European Parliament introduced a 
budget reserve of € 1.37 million that “shall be released once the Commission will present a 
proposal for the transfer of Commission staff in DG RELEX to the EEAS unit dealing 
with Peacebuilding and Crisis Response, in line with previous commitments and 
statements by High Representative/Vice President” (Official Journal of the European 
Union 2011a: II/79). This negative stance on peacebuilding staffing in the EEAS has also 
been shared by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office. For example, in February 2011 
it argued that it would be very problematic for “a skeletal team of just three staff 
members” within the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy of the EEAS 
to programme the IfS “strategically, effectively and consistently”, monitor the funding, 
contribute expertise to the programming of other instruments, provide analysis, 
cooperate with external actors, and build knowledge about conflict prevention (EPLO 
2011: 1-2). 
This question would be of little relevance in terms of creating EEAS, with more than 
3600 staff already employed in the headquarters and delegations, but those following this 
dispute argue that this case illustrates a broader problem of the EEAS role in the area of 
conflict prevention and management since there is a serious concern that due to the lack 
of peace building expertise in the service, its specificity will be neglected in EU foreign 
policy (Smith, 2010a, 2010b). It was observed that units coming from the Council 
Secretariat and dealing with conflict management and operations (EU Military Staff, 
Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, and Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Capability) are separated in the EEAS structure from the peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention units coming from the Commission. Therefore, both MEPs and NGOs argued 
that this structure is not appropriate and that further integration of the EEAS units active 
in conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding into a unified structure was 
critical (Brantner et al. 2011; ELPO 2011: 2-3). In consequence, some are alarmed that 
former European Community instruments such as IfS may be dominated by an 
intergovernmental approach of conflict management units and their military experience 
and expertise. In other words, some participants in this institutional conflict were afraid 
that the conservative approach to peacebuilding would become the dominant way of 
dealing with crisis situations due to continuity of practices based on a military approach, 
in view of the lack of alternative ideas emerging from the EEAS itself. Additionally, they 
are worried that the Community budget will in fact be managed following the needs of 
intergovernmental and underfinanced CSDP operations, leading in fact to the 
nationalization of previously communitarized components of EU foreign policy.19
 
 
19  The British government has already recognized that its aim is “to ensure that EEAS staff who are respon-
sible for setting strategic priorities for the short-term IfS component adopt a comprehensive approach to 
stabilization integrating both the military and civilian dimensions” (House of Commons 2011: 93). 
 The 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Parliament expressed its opposition to this 
possibility, claiming that “under no circumstances is formal or informal control by CSDP 
structures of Stability Instrument Article 3 and 4 measures acceptable and in line with the 
The European Union Peacebuilding Approach 29 
 
 
Treaties” (European Parliament 2010a: 3). As a result, at stake in this apparently 
irrelevant bureaucratic disagreement is the possibility of substantial redefinition of EU 
practices in the crisis response and peacebuilding fields in the direction of conservative 
models, and the disappearance of alternative approaches from the EU menu of choices in 
dealing with crisis response. 
7.  Conclusion 
Liberal peace represents the dominant paradigm of contemporary peacebuilding, which 
prioritizes statebuilding through law and order institutions as well as democratic 
governance and market economy. In this report, the EU practices of peacebuilding have 
been analysed in the light of different models of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. In 
view of the lack of any comprehensive and complete EU doctrine on peacebuilding, the 
focus on practices pursued through the Instrument for Stability enabled reconstruction of 
the EU’s approach to peacebuilding and conflict management.  
Overall, analysis of the IfS practices with regard to peacebuilding exposes the EU’s 
consensus concerning conservative and orthodox models of liberal peace, which 
emphasize security concerns and state institutions as well as political and economic 
problems and institutions of democratic governance. This consensus when approaching 
conflict response and peacebuilding is reified by the smooth and uncomplicated process 
of decision-making in particular cases, since there are very few instances of conflicts 
between the Commission, Council and Parliament with reference to IfS projects. 
Similarly, the overview of specific measures implemented in the framework of the IfS 
provides corroboration that the conservative/orthodox mandate provided by the IfS 
Regulation is also being implemented in practice. Additionally, the institutional debates 
and controversies affecting the IfS and concerning the role of peacebuilding activities in 
the EEAS suggest that this approach of mixing conservative and orthodox elements of 
liberal peace building is not confronted with any alternative proposals. 
These observations require, however, an additional caveat: the IfS is designed as an 
instrument that is supplementary to other geographical instruments of external action 
aimed at addressing root causes of crises and conflicts. The analysis of these instruments 
was beyond the scope of this report, but the EU’s dominant focus on statebuilding and 
building of democratic governance and market economic institutions during the critical 
phase of post-conflict suggests that, even if other concerns are present in later stages of 
peacebuilding processes, the EU conceives peacebuilding as a process of settling conflicts 
within the logic of modern liberal states. Furthermore, the analysis of current practices 
points also to the fact that, in view of the lack of political debates on the EU peacebuilding 
doctrine that would strategically and politically inform the use of instruments and tools of 
peacebuilding, the dominant mood among EU officials and decision-makers is risk-
aversion. This leads to a permanent tendency for technical considerations of particular 
measures to lose their strategic perspective. Paradoxically, this is not so much due to the 
lack of strategic documents, but to the wide array of them and consequent difficulties in 
setting clear policy priorities. 
30 Michal Natorski 
 
 
The current EU approach to peacebuilding is the result of evolving policy practices 
and the evolution of international debates on peacebuilding and not a preconceived 
general policy responding to intra-EU debates on peacebuilding doctrine. From the 
internal perspective, the Instrument for Stability was conceived rather as the 
Commission’s practical response to the general demands of the greater EU’s involvement 
in conflict prevention and peace-building activities. It was aimed at contributing to the 
enhancement and diversification of EU crisis response capacities beyond CSDP civilian 
and military missions by addressing issues regarded as immediate causes and results of 
crises and conflicts through activities which lay beyond the conservative logic of third 
party intervention in order to stop conflicts and mediate between parties. The more 
flexible character of the IfS also differs from CFSP instruments and CSDP missions, 
where ad hoc policy considerations, domestic policy constraints, scarce resources and 
cumbersome procedures prevail at the moment of adopting crisis response measures. 
The practices of EU peacebuilding, including the IfS measures, were also strongly 
influenced by the international debates and especially emerging agreements in the 
framework of the United Nations. Therefore, in reaction to these international 
developments, the EU adopted a mosaic of diverse documents on specific priorities that 
were later progressively incorporated into the EU activities. As a result, in the last decade 
the EU has adopted dozens of policy documents concerning conflict prevention and 
security, but there is general concern that the EU is failing to deliver results in its 
ambitious policies in this area. This situation is leading to a deadlock among competing 
principles. The variety of policy documents frequently provokes paralyzing concerns 
about the possible errors and political controversies that a more innovative use of the IfS 
might trigger, thus stimulating self-imposed limitations at the moment of deciding about 
the measures to be applied in very sensitive and demanding areas of security and 
conflict/crisis response. This self-restraint is further stirred by insufficient human 
resources and expertise in the very concrete fields of conflict prevention, peace-building 
and security challenges, due to the characteristics of this policy field, which requires 
advanced policy and technical expertise. At the same time, the lack of resources has 
further reinforced strong reliance on the expertise of other international organizations 
and, especially the United Nations, in the implementation of projects and activities, 
reducing EU visibility worldwide and limiting the possibility of conceiving any specific 
EU approach to peacebuilding. Therefore, in stark contrast with the myths of “Brussels 
bureaucracy”, the report has emphasized that, in reality, an instrument amounting to  
€ 2 billion is implemented by a very few overloaded officials of the EU. 
As a result, policy ambitions are constrained by path-dependent approaches, viewing 
the EU as an international donor instead of a self-confident and autonomous actor 
providing its own clearly visible and creative solutions to crises and conflicts. The EU did 
not deliver its own specific approach to peacebuilding which, consistent with the liberal 
international consensus, could also provide some solutions reflecting to a greater extent 
the very nature of the EU collective polity. As we have seen, even within the dominant 
liberal peacebuilding paradigm there are several models that can provide intellectual 
templates in order to build up an EU peacebuilding doctrine in a reflexive manner, and 
tailor the IfS in a way that enables it to go beyond support for third-party intervention in 
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conflict-torn societies. The predominance of conservative and orthodox practices of 
peacebuilding in the CSDP framework and in the approaches of other international 
donors leaves ample room for actors more reliant on emancipatory models. 
The IfS is due to be reshaped during the forthcoming negotiations on the EU’s 
financial framework 2014-2020. Improvement of the EU’s capacities for crisis prevention 
and resolution as well as improved coordination of its tools in peace-building processes 
are among the six strategic objectives identified by the European Commission (European 
Commission 2011d: 191-192). However, due to the lack of a comprehensive debate on the 
EU peacebuilding doctrine, negotiations will most probably turn into a technical exercise 
of drawing a new regulation meeting some administrative expectations addressing 
problems of institutional coherence and efficiency. In fact, the Commission already 
considers that under the current Regulation the IfS worked reasonably well, and there is 
no need for comprehensive revision. Some particular questions were raised in order to 
enhance the policy-driven character of the instrument, strengthen crisis response 
capacities, improve synergies with other EU external action instruments as well as 
enhance measures aimed at tackling global security threats and risks. Similarly, the 
European Parliament underlined in general the relevance of the instruments for crisis 
prevention and management, including the IfS, but stressed the need to focus on long-
term, preventive actions, including peacebuilding and conflict prevention via geographic 
programmes (European Parliament 2011). 
In the light of this report assessment, the IfS might evolve in three directions, implying 
a different role of the IfS in the future architecture of the instruments of the EU external 
action. A first possible scenario is that the IfS evolves into a kind of flanking measure for 
CSDP missions, especially in view of the increasing number of civilian missions. In this 
way, the IfS would transform itself from a former Community instrument with a 
comprehensive approach, to a more selective instrument for the support activities of the 
former intergovernmental pillar. In this sense, the IfS would end up focusing uniquely on 
crises and conflicts where the EU is already engaged. Hence, this tendency would limit 
considerably the thematic scope and geographical reach of the IfS measures. Therefore, 
this scenario would lead to reducing considerably the EU’s ambitions in peacebuilding 
and conflict prevention and probably to the establishment of a conservative liberal peace 
model as the only point of reference in designing EU peacebuilding actions. 
The second possible scenario is that the new institutional structures of the EU external 
action and the debates about policy instruments will be hostage to conflicts about the 
scarce financial resources available to the EU in the 2014-2020 period. Therefore, instead 
of building upon the lessons learned from the IfS implementation in order to improve the 
EU conflict response instruments, other considerations will reduce the scope of the 
debates. This unfortunate tendency would obstruct the ability of the EU for self-reflexive 
building of its resources and instruments in areas of crisis response and peace-building. 
In this scenario we might expect a simple follow-up of the current IfS practices, including 
its existing shortcomings and contradictions. In other words, the IfS would fall short of 
meeting political criteria in the process of decision-making and, in turn, technical and 
bureaucratic considerations would continue overshadowing the policy content of the 
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EU’s approach in the field of peacebuilding. Therefore, this scenario would result in the 
continuation of the existing implicit conservative/orthodox consensus. 
The third scenario assumes an enhanced linkage between strategic-policy planning 
and the use of available or redesigned instruments and tools balancing different 
principles. Establishing clear and strategic policy benchmarks would be an outcome of 
sound debate on the EU peacebuilding doctrine and careful assessment of its capabilities. 
Additionally, clear strategic guidance would facilitate assessment of the effectiveness of 
policies and measures and their future improvement, on the basis of a reflexive and 
planned process of institutional learning, something which is much needed in view of the 
new rules provided by the Treaty of Lisbon. The new IfS Regulation would benefit from 
assessing successes and failures of the conservative/orthodox approach in the light of 
existing alternatives provided by emancipatory approaches. Even if the EU will not revise 
in depth the current liberal peace model as implicit policy guidance, the inclusion of 
alternative approaches proposed in view of frequent failures of conservative and orthodox 
approaches would better equip EU’s peacebuilding practices. Therefore, the inclusion of 
an emancipatory approach to the EU peacebuilding menu of choice could contribute 
further solutions and tools, especially in those protracted and long-standing crisis 
situations where existing approaches have failed to provide solutions. 
The creation of the EEAS allows imagining that in the future, more focused and 
coordinated efforts in policy planning could be accompanied by more careful assessment 
of the available and/or necessary resources and instruments. This would require temporal 
synchronization, sequencing policy planning and in-depth critical periodical reviews of 
policy documents in the field of EU foreign policy. Therefore, in order that this third 
scenario could materialize, it would be essential that the newly created EEAS undertook a 
revision of existing strategies and policy programmes in order to adapt their content and 
reach to the outcomes of the forthcoming negotiations of the 2014-2020 financial 
framework, taking into account, however, the experiences of successful alternative 
measures and approaches implemented in view of the failure of the existing standard 
approaches of conservative and orthodox versions of the liberal peace paradigm. 
The European Union Peacebuilding Approach 33 
 
 
References 
Barnett, Michael, Kim, Hunjoon, O’Donnell, Madalene and Sitea, Laure 2007: Peacebuild-
ing: What Is in a Name? Global Governance, 13:1, 35-58. 
Bayne, Sarah and Trolliet, Patrick 2009: Stocktaking and scoping of the Peacebuilding 
Partnership, For the European Commission – DG RELEX A/2. 
Brantner, Franziska, and Elmar Brok, Roberto Gualtieri, Andrey Kovatchev, Alexander 
Graf Lambsdorff, Guy Verhofstadt 2011: Letter to Baroness Catherine Ashton of 
Upholland, Vice-President/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Poli-
cy, Strasbourg, in: www.bruxelles2.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/letter-HRVP.pdf 
(10.04.2011). 
Council of the European Union 2001: Draft European Union Programme for the 
Prevention of Violent Conflicts, 9537/1/01 REV 1, Brussels. 
Council of the European Union 2004: Commission proposal for a Council Regulation 
establishing an instrument for stability, 14289/04, Brussels. 
Council of the European Union 2006a: Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and 
the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability, 7443/1/06 REV 1, Brussels. 
Council of the European Union 2006b: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability (first reading) – 
Adoption of the legislative act (LA+S), Statements, 14010/06 ADD 1, Brussels. 
Council of the European Union 2010a: Annual Report on the implementation of the EU 
Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflict 2010, 10477/10, Brussels. 
Council of the European Union 2010b: Report on CIVCOM in “plus” format meeting on 
implementation of the EU Programme for prevention of violent conflicts (Göteborg 
Programme), 17847/10, Brussels. 
Council of the European Union 2011: Council conclusions on conflict prevention, 3101st 
Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg. 
Dahl Thruelsen, Peter 2009: International Organisations: Their Role in Conflict 
Management, Copenhagen, 13-24. 
EPLO 2011, Conflict prevention and peacebuilding inside the EEAS, Brussels. 
European Commission 2001: Communication from the Commission on the Conflict 
Prevention, COM(2001) 211, Brussels. 
European Commission 2004: Proposal for a Regulation of the Council establishing an 
Instrument for Stability (presented by the Commission), COM(2004) 630, Brussels. 
European Commission 2007: Commission Decision adopting a Strategy Paper for the 
Instrument for Stability for the period 2007-2011, C(2007)3701, Brussels. 
34 Michal Natorski 
 
 
European Commission 2008a: Commission Staff Working Document (…) Annual report 
from the European Commission on the Instrument for Stability in 2007 – Executive 
Summary, SEC(2008) 446, Brussels. 
European Commission 2009a: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 establishing an Instrument 
for Stability, COM(2009) 195, Brussels. 
European Commission 2009b: Commission Staff Working Document. Report evaluating 
the implementation of the financial instruments for external actions accompanying 
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council. Mid-term review of the financial instruments for external actions, SEC(2009) 
530, Brussels. 
European Commission 2009c: Summary report for the European Parliament. 7th Meeting 
of the Instrument for Stability Management Committee on 26 March 2009, 
AIDCO.g.8 Ares(2009)97588, Brussels. 
European Commission 2009d: Summary report for the European Parliament. 8th Meeting 
of the Instrument for Stability Management Committee on 15 July 2009, 
Ares(2009)218982, Brussels. 
European Commission 2010a: Report from the Commission to (…). 2009 Annual Report 
from the European Commission on the Instrument for Stability, COM(2010) 512 final, 
Brussels. 
European Commission 2010b: Summary report for the European Parliament. 12th Meeting 
of the Instrument for Stability Committee, 15 September 2010, AIDCO/G8(2010) 
MP/sr, Brussels. 
European Commission 2010c: Report from the Commission (…). 2009 Annual Report 
from the European Commission on the Instrument for Stability, COM(2010) 512 final, 
Brussels. 
European Commission 2010d: Minutes of the 1934th meeting of the Commission held in 
Brussels on Wednesday, 27 October 2010 (morning), PV(2010) 1934, Brussels. 
European Commission 2011a: Commission Staff Working Paper (…). 2010 Annual 
Reports on the Instrument for Stability. Part II, COM (2011) 494, Brussels. 
European Commission 2011b: Report from the Commission to (…) 2010 Annual Report 
on the Instrument for Stability, COM(2011) 1000, Brussels. 
European Commission 2011c: Opinion of the Commission pursuant to Article 294(7)(c) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on the European 
Parliament's amendments to the Council's position regarding the proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, COM 
(2011) 179, Brussels. 
The European Union Peacebuilding Approach 35 
 
 
European Commission 2011d: Commission Staff Working Paper. A Budget for Europe 
2020: the current system of funding, the challenges ahead, the results of stakeholders 
consultation and different options on the main horizontal and sectoral issues (…), 
SEC (2011) 868, Brussels. 
European Parliament 2009: Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Par-
liament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 establishing an 
Instrument for Stability (COM(2009)0195 – C7-0042/2009-2009/0058(COD)), A7-
0066/2009, PE428.290v02.00, 13 November. 
European Parliament 2010a: Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for the Com-
mittee on Budgets on the Interinstitutional Agreement on cooperation in budgetary 
matters (2010/2073(INI), PE445.860v02-00. 
European Parliament 2011: European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2011 on Investing 
in the future: a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for a competitive, sus-
tainable and inclusive Europe (2010/2211(INI), Strasbourg. 
European Voice 2010: Commission hopes service will hit all the right notes. 
Gänzle, Stefan 2009: Coping with the ‘Security-Development Nexus`: The European 
Community’s Instrument for Stability – Rationales and Potential, Studies German De-
velopment Institute, 47, Bonn. 
Gawerc, Michelle I. 2006: Peace-building: theoretical and concrete perspectives: Peace & 
Change, 31:4, 435-478. 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2010: Conflict Barometer 2010, 
Heidelberg. 
Heathershaw, John 2008: Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of 
Peacebuilding Discourses, Millennium, 36:3, 97-621. 
High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission 2010: Statement given by 
the High Representative in the plenary of the European Parliament on the basic orga-
nisation of the EEAS central administration, Strasbourg. 
Hoffmeister, Frank 2008: Das Verhältnis zwischen Entwicklungspolitik und Gemeinsamer 
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik am Beispiel des EG-Stabilitätsinstruments, Europa-
recht, Beiheft 2, 55-76. 
House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee 2011: Thirteenth Report of Session 
2010-11 (12.01.2011), HC 428-xii, London. 
Mac Ginty, Roger 2008: Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace, Cooperation 
and Conflict, 43:2, 139-163. 
Major, Claudia and Mölling, Christian 2010: Towards an EU Peacebuilding Strategy? EU 
Civilian Coordination in Peacebuilding and the effects of the Lisbon Treaty, European 
Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Policy Depart-
ment. 
36 Michal Natorski 
 
 
Newman, Edward, Paris, Roland and Richmond, Oliver P. 2009: Introduction, in: New-
man, Edward, Paris, Roland and Richmond, Oliver P. (eds.), New Perspectives on Lib-
eral Peacebuilding, Tokyo, 3-25. 
Official Journal of the European Union 2006: Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing and Instrument 
for Stability, No. L 327, 1-11. 
Official Journal of the European Union 2010: Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing 
the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
(2010/427/EU), L 201, 30-40. 
Official Journal of the European Union 2011a: Definitive adoption of the European Un-
ion’s general budget for the financial year 2011, Volume II, L 68. 
Page Fortna, Virginia and Morjé Howard, Lise 2008: Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peace-
keeping Literature, Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 283-301. 
Paris, Roland 2010: Saving liberal peacebuilding, Review of International Studies, 36:2, 
337-365. 
Richmond, Oliver P. 2006: The problem of peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’, Con-
flict, Security and Development, 6:3, 291-314. 
Richmond, Oliver P. 2008: Peace in International Relations, London and New York. 
Richmond, Oliver P. 2009: A post-liberal peace: Eirenism and the everyday, Review of 
International Studies, 35:3, 557-580. 
Richmond, Oliver P. 2010a: Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace, Millennium, 38:3, 665-
692. 
Richmond, Oliver P. 2010b: A genealogy of peace and conflict theory, in: Oliver P. Rich-
mond (ed.), Peacebuilding: critical developments and approaches, Basingstoke: Pal-
grave, 14-38. 
Richmond, Oliver P., Björkdahl, Annika and Kappler, Stefanie 2011: The emerging EU 
peacebuilding framework: confirming or transcending liberal peacebuilding? Cam-
bridge Review of International Affairs, 24:3, 449-469. 
Smith, Dan 2010a: Time to rescue the EU’s External Action Service from the European 
Commission, Dan Smith’s blog: Analysis and commentary on world issues, in: 
http://dansmithsblog.com/2010/11/22/time-to-rescue-the-eus-external-action-service-
from-the-european-commission/#more-950 (10.04.2011). 
Smith, Dan 2010b: EAS: officially launched but the tussle continues, Dan Smith’s blog: 
Analysis and commentary on world issues, in: http://dansmithsblog.com/2010/12/03/ 
eas-officially-launched-but-the-tussle-continues/ (10.04.2011). 
  
The European Union Peacebuilding Approach 37 
 
 
Acronyms and special terms 
 
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear 
Comitology – the European Commission’s system for implementing EU legislation  
overseen by committees consisting of Member State representatives. 
CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy 
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy 
DCI – Instrument for Development Cooperation 
DG AIDOC – Directorate General EuropeAid Co-Operation Office 
DG DEVCO – Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid 
DG RELEX – Directorate General of External Relations 
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States 
EEAS – European External Action Service 
ENPI – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy 
EU – European Union 
FPIS – Foreign Policy Instrument Service 
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency 
IfS – Instrument for Stability  
INSC – Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 
IPA – Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
MEPs – Members of the European Parliament 
UN – United Nations 
SALW – Small Arms and Light Weapons 
TEC – Treaty establishing the European Community 
TEU – Treaty on the European Union 
TFUE – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
